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Chronopost v. Ufex: The Paradox of
the Competing Monopolist
Alessandra Fratini & Andrea Carta*
1. INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 2003, in the Chronopost judgment,' the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ" or "the Court") defined the conditions under which a public
undertaking, enjoying a legal monopoly for the provision of services of
general interest, can provide services to its subsidiaries without infringing
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.2 The impact of this judgment on European
Community ("EC") state aid policy and public services is potentially large,
in both legal and practical terms. The ruling casts light on the real dilemma
underlying the application of state aid rules to the circumstances of the case:
how to allow public companies, entrusted with a network enabling them to
provide a given service to all users, to operate in competitive markets while,
at the same time, preventing these public operators from unduly exploiting
the specific advantages of their position as network operators, in terms of
economies of scale/scope, on the downstream competitive markets.
This article deals with the principles defined by the ECJ in the
Chronopost ruling. The Part II presents the history and background of the
judgment, with a short overview of the various aspects of the legal dispute,
which the July 2003 ruling brought to an end. The Part III includes some
comments on the judgment, and tries to assess the potential consequences
* Attorneys, O'Connor and Company, Brussels. The authors would like to thank their
colleague Fabio Filpo for comments on an earlier draft of this article. Any opinions or
mistakes are those of the authors.
1 Joined Cases 83/01, 93/01 & 94/01 P, Chronopost v. Ufex (July 3, 2003) at http://
curia.eu.int/en/index.htm.
2 Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty states: "Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any
aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be
incompatible with the common market." CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 67 (2002)
[hereinafter EC TREATY].
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of the Court's reasoning in legal terms. Finally, the Chronopost ruling is
read in the context of the broader political debate taking place across the
European Community regarding services of general economic interest
("SGEIs").3
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND: FROM SFEI TO CHRONOPOST
A. The SFEI Judgment
The ruling of the ECJ in Chronopost represents the final outcome of a
lengthy dispute that started as early as December 1990. Litigation began
when the French association of international express couriers ("SFEI") filed
a complaint with the Commission claiming, essentially, that the logistical
and commercial assistance afforded by the French Post Office ("La Poste")
to its affiliated company providing express courier services (at the time
"SFMI," subsequently renamed "SFMI-Chronopost") constituted illegal
state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty, as access to
La Poste's network was granted at more advantageous terms than those
available on the market.
The Commission decided to take no action on the complaint under
Article 87 of the EC Treaty.4 On June 16, 1993, SFEI filed suit against La
Poste and Chronopost before the national judge, claiming that La Poste's
assistance to Chronopost was in breach of Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty
and any unlawful state aid was to be repaid to La Poste. The Paris
Commercial Court (Tribunal de Commerce) referred a number of questions
on the interpretation of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling, pursuant to Article 234 of the EC Treaty. It asked, inter
alia, whether measures adopted by the French Post Office, consisting of the
3 While the E.C. institutions have repeatedly highlighted the importance of SGEIs (See,
e.g., Communication from the Commission on Services of General Interest in Europe, 2001
O.J. (C 17) 4; Report to the Laeken European Council on Services of General Interest,
COM(01)598 final; Communication from the Commission on Services of General Interest in
Europe, 1996 O.J. (C 281) 3), the underlying concept is yet to be clarified. In general, it
corresponds to the more generic concept of public service and encompasses the notion of
universal service. In this regard, the case law itself is not very precise and indistinctly refers
to services of general interest, universal services, public services or services of public
interest. However, the exact scope of these notions is not relevant for the purpose of this
article. We will indistinctly refer to SGEIs, public services, etc. For a more accurate
definition of those concepts, see Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM(03)270
final, at 6-7, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/gpr/2003/
com20030270en01 .pdf.
4 The Commission notified SFEI of its decision by letter of March 10, 1992. SFEI
lodged an action with the ECJ for annulment of that decision. See Case 222/92, SFEI v.
Commission (1992) (unreported). By its order of November 18, 1992, the Court ruled that it
was not necessary to proceed to judgment, in the light of the subsequent Commission
Decision of July 9, 1992, to withdraw the decision of March 10, 1992. See infra Part 2.2.
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grant of logistical and commercial assistance to its controlled express
courier operator, were to be regarded as state aid within the meaning of
Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty, where no normal payment was fixed in
return.5
In its ruling given on July 11, 1996, the ECJ defined the fundamental
principle that has given rise to a great deal of debate, both in jurisprudence
6
and legal literature. The ECJ held that, "[i]n order to determine whether a
State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to establish whether the
recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage which it would not
have obtained under normal market conditions."7 However, the Court left it
up to the national court to decide what was to be considered the "normal"
remuneration for the services in question.
In essence, the ECJ established the principle by affirming that "[s]uch
a determination presupposes an economic analysis taking into account all
the factors which an undertaking acting under normal market conditions
should have taken into consideration when fixing the remuneration for the
services provided," 8 but it did not enumerate the factors. 9  Shaping the
economic content of this principle was meant to be the task of the
Commission, the Court of First Instance, and finally, the ECJ in the
following episodes of the Chronopost saga.
B. The Commission Decision 98/365/EC
After the action against La Poste and Chronopost was lodged before
the French judge, the Commission decided to withdraw its earlier decision
of March 10, 1992, and reopen the case, pursuant to Article 88 (2) of the
EC Treaty. The Commission adopted its Decision on October 1, 1997 with
respect to the assistance 9rovided by the French Post Office to Chronopost
over the period 1986-91.
5 Case 39/94, SFEI v. La Poste, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3547, 1-3583-84.
6 For comments on the SFEI judgment see Giuseppe B. Abbamonte, Competitors' Rights
to Challenge Illegally Granted Aid and the Problem of Conflicting Decisions in the Field of
Competition Law, 18 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 87 (1997); Marie-Ang~le Hermitte et al.,
Chronique de Jurisprudence du Tribunal et de la Cour de Justice des Communaut~s
Europennes [Chronicle of the Tribunal and the Court of the European Communities], 124 J.
DU DROIT INT'L 479, 609 (1997); Michel L. Struys, SFEI-A Missed Opportunity, 6 IRIS.4 J.
EuR. L. 181, 181-89 (1997).
' SFEI, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-3596 (emphasis added).
8 Id.
9 It is worth noting that, in his Opinion, the Advocate General suggested that the
following were to be taken into consideration: "the cost of providing the assistance, the size
of its investment in the undertaking and its return from it, the importance of the activity of
the undertaking to the investing group as a whole, conditions on the market in question and
the period for which the assistance is granted." Id. at 1-3568.
10 See Commission Decision 98/365/EC of 1 October 1997 Concerning Alleged State Aid
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In the framework of these proceedings, the parties advanced two
different approaches to the criteria to be used for the purpose of identifying
"normal market conditions" within the meaning of the SFEI ruling.
According to SFEI, in defining the normal price for the logistic and
commercial assistance provided to Chronopost, the economies of scale
enjoyed by La Poste by virtue of its monopolistic position should have been
taken into account, "since those economies were precisely the root-cause of
the distortion in competition."" SFEI maintained that the costs that an
undertaking would have incurred, in setting up and operating a network
similar to that used by La Poste, should have been considered in order to
calculate the costs of the main components of the logistical assistance. It
also submitted that the Commission should have examined whether, for the
logistical and commercial services provided by the French Post Office,
Chronopost had paid the "normal market price," i.e., "the price at which a
comparable private company would provide the same services to an
unrelated company."' 12 That price should have included a fee for access to
the postal network. The complainants also suggested that, in order to
comply with the principle defined by the ECJ, "the Commission should
[have] disregard[ed] the group's strategic interests and the economies of
scale arising from the privileged access of [Chronopost] to [La Poste's]
network and infrastructure."1 3 According to SFEI, such considerations were
not "taken into account... because the Post Office ha[d] a monopoly."' 4
Chronopost should have borne "the costs that a private undertaking would
[have incurred] in creating a network equivalent to that of the Post
Office."' 5
The Commission carried out its own analysis on the economics of the
provision of logistical and commercial services, and acknowledged that the
price paid by Chronopost to La Poste was higher than the total operating
costs incurred by the latter for the provision of logistical assistance.'
Further, it recognized that fixed costs were allocated in proportion to the
business carried out by La Poste on behalf of the subsidiary, and thus
agreed with the French authorities that the remuneration paid by
Chronopost was sufficient to cover the marketing cost incurred by the
incumbent.' 7 The Commission also rejected the complainants' argument
Granted by France to SFMI-Chronopost, 1998 O.J. (L 164) 37.
" Id. at41.
12 Id. at 44-45 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 45.
14 id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 43.




that the costs of setting up the network should have been taken into
account. 18 In this respect, it underlined that, in making any comparison
between the French Post Office and other express courier operators, it is
necessary to consider the different cost structure of the publicly owned
company. 19
Next, and more importantly, the Commission dismissed the
complainants' interpretation of the ECJ ruling in SFEI and stated its view
on the definition of "normal market conditions." It read the judgment as
saying that, in order to establish whether state aid was involved in a
transaction between two undertakings of a state-owned group, it is
necessary to verify whether the parent company had received the normal
consideration in return for the services provided to the subsidiary.2 °
Accordingly, it considered that "internal prices at which products and
services are transacted between companies belonging to the same group do
not involve any financial advantage whatsoever if they are full-cost prices
(total costs plus a mark-up to remunerate equity capital investment)."2
After examining the economic relationship between La Poste and
Chronopost, the Commission concluded that logistical and commercial
assistance had been provided against full-cost coverage, thus under "normal
market conditions."" The Commission concluded that such assistance did
not constitute state aid.23
C. The Annulment Action before the Court of First Instance
SFEI, which had in the meantime become Union Francaise de
l'Express ("UFEX"), responded by bringing an action for the annulment of
the Commission's decision before the Court of First Instance ("CFI") .24
Chronopost, La Poste, and the French Republic intervened in support of the
Commission.
The applicants claimed that the Commission had misinterpreted the
SFEI judgment and assessed the existence of state aid on the basis of
incorrect methods. They argued that the Commission should have taken
into account the fact that the monopoly holder operates outside "normal
market conditions" and thus would not necessarily pass all the costs
incurred for services rendered on to its subsidiary. More specifically,
according to UFEX, an undertaking operating in "normal market
18 Id. at 43-44.
19 Id. at 44.




24 Case T-613/97, Ufex and Others v. Commission, 2000 E.C.R. 11-4055. [hereinafter
Ufex]
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conditions" would have had to bear, and pass onto its subsidiary, the
network costs and include these in the price for assistance provided 2 The
applicants further observed that the normal remuneration for the services
provided by La Poste to Chronopost should have included the long-term
marginal costs as well as the fixed costs of acquiring and maintaining
infrastructure in the form of buildings, equipment, and staff.26 The long-
term marginal costs borne by La Poste thus allegedly constituted cross-
subsidies to the benefit of Chronopost. Under this line of reasoning, the
remuneration that La Poste was to claim from its subsidiary should have
been calculated on the basis of the price that a private company would have
had to pay, in normal competitive conditions, for equivalent logistical and
commercial support.27
The Commission replied that cross-subsidization within a public group
does not always constitute state aid.2 8 On the contrary, it may be part of a
long-term strategy which will benefit the group as a whole. The
Commission also stated that a monopoly undertaking could always
conclude "balanced bilateral contracts,"29 and that no prejudice should have
derived from the particular nature of the parent company's activities. In
this respect, the analysis carried out by the Commission showed that the
subsidiary paid more than the coverage of full costs. As for the critical
issue regarding the economies of scale and scope connected with the
management of a monopolistic network, the Commission stated that
synergies and strategic considerations within a group could not, as such, be
considered as incompatible with Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty, provided
that all costs were taken into account when calculating the remuneration for
services rendered. The Commission recalled the EC law principle of
neutrality with regards to systems of property ownership in the member
states and the principle of equal treatment of publicly owned and private
undertakings (Article 295 of the EC Treaty). 30 These principles imply that
member states are allowed to carry out economic activities and to make
investments according to a strategy corresponding to that of a private
investor. Such activities would not, per se, entail state aid.31
With its judgment on January 14, 2000, the CFI endorsed the
25 Id. at para. 44.
26 Id. at para. 42. The applicants contended that the Commission's guidelines on the
application of the EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector, 1991 O.J. (C
233) 2, set out the Commission's position with regard to cross-subsidies.
27 Id. at para. 44.
28 Id. at para. 51.
29 Id. at para. 52.
30 According to Article 295 of the EC Treaty, the Treaty "shall in no way prejudice the
rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership." EC TREATY, supra
note 2, art. 295.
31 Ufex, supra note 24.
Chronopost v. Ufex
24:773 (2004)
applicants' arguments and annulled the Commission's Decision. First, the
CFI pointed out that the mere fact that the subsidiary paid the full costs
incurred by French Post Office was not in itself sufficient to show that no
aid, within the meaning of Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty, had been
granted. 2 Instead, the CFI took the view that the Commission "should at
least have checked that the payment received in return by La Poste was
comparable to that demanded by a private holding company or a private
group of undertakings not operating in a reserved sector, pursuing a
structural policy-whether general or sectorial-and guided by long-term
prospects," and that
by ruling out the very existence of state aid without checking whether
the remuneration received by La Poste for the provision of commercial
and logistical assistance to SFMI-Chronopost corresponded to the price
that would have been asked under normal market conditions, the
Commission based its decision on an incorrect interpretation of Article
92 [now 87] of the EC Treaty.
33
The case before the CFI presented two possible approaches to defining
"normal market conditions." The Commission's first approach interprets
the ECJ ruling in SFEI as saying that, in order to be compatible with Article
87 (1) of the EC Treaty, the price of services provided by a public
undertaking operating a monopoly must cover the total costs that are
incurred by the holding company when providing the services (the "cost-
based approach").34 According to the second approach, endorsed by the
CFI, "normal market conditions" should be established with regard to the
price that a firm not operating a public network would have charged for the
provision of the services in question (the "market-price approach").3 5
While in the first case "normal market conditions" are defined from the
provider's perspective, in the second case these are defined from the point
of view of the recipient.
36
32 Id. at para. 74.
33 Id. at para. 75.
34 Id. at para. 72.
35 Id. at para. 75. (emphasis added).
36 It is settled case law that the existence of state aid should be assessed taking into
consideration the effects of the transfer of resources might have on the market. See Case
173/73, Italy v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 709, 13. Consistent with this approach, the
recipient's point of view is crucial because it can verify the existence of an advantage can be
verified. For a general overview of E.C. state aid law, see, generally, ANDREA BIONDI, PIET
EECKHOUT & JAMES FLYNN, THE LAW OF STATE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Oxford University
Press 2003); CONOR QUIGLEY & ANTHONY M. COLLINS, EC STATE AID LAW AND POLICY
(Hart Publishing 2003); LEIGH HANCHER, TOM OTTERVANGER & PIETER J. SLOT, EC STATE
AIDS (Sweet & Maxwell 1999); ANDREW EVANS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF STATE AID
(Oxford European Community Law Series 1997).
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D. The ECJ's Consideration of Chronopost
Chronopost, La Poste, and the French Republic brought an appeal
against the judgment of the CFI before the ECJ.37 Once more the
Community judge was called upon to give an opinion on the facts that had
been at the root of the SFEI case. This time, however, the Court simply
could not reiterate a statement of principle. It was obliged to explain-in
more precise terms - how the notion of "normal market conditions" was to
be applied to the provision of services from a public undertaking, operating
a public network for the provision of the universal postal service, to a
subsidiary operating in the competitive market of express delivery services.
The Court was faced with the choice between the Commission's cost-
based approach and the market-price approach supported by the CFI, which
required showing, for state aid to be excluded, that the transactions
concerned would be comparable to those taking place between undertakings
operating in "normal market conditions." Following the conclusions of the
Advocate General,38 which particularly focused on the status of public firms
entrusted with the provision of services of general interest, the ECJ
endorsed the Commission's approach.
The Court's reasoning was that the CFI unduly failed to take account
of the fact that an undertaking such as a public postal operator is in a
situation "that is very different from that of a private undertaking acting
under normal market conditions. 39 In order to provide the universal postal
service, the ECJ explained, the French post office had to create and
maintain a network whose characteristics "are not in line with a purely
commercial approach" and that, therefore, "would have never been created
by a private undertaking." 40 The ECJ went further and recognized that the
public postal network had no equivalent on the market and none of
Chronopost's competitors had ever requested access to La Poste's network.
Hence, the solution to the point at issue was to assess "normal market
conditions," "which are necessarily hypothetical," by reference to "the
objective and verifiable elements which are available."4 1 In the absence of
a benchmark, which would allow for the amount charged to Chronopost
being checked against the price this undertaking would have paid on the
market for the same services, the Court concluded that the cost borne by the
public operator represented such objective and verifiable elements. By so
37 See Chronopost, at http://curia.eu.int/en/index.htm.
38 Joined Cases 83/01, 93/01 & 94/01 P, Chronopost v. Ufex (Dec. 12, 2002), at
http://curia.eu.int./jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang-en&Submit-Submit&docrequire
=alldocs&numaff=-C-83%2F0 I +P&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=
&resmax= 100 (Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano).
39 Chronopost, at http://curia.eu.int/en/index.htm.
40 Id. at para. 36.
41 Id. at para. 38.
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doing, the ECJ espoused the provider's perspective endorsed by the
Commission.
On this point, the Opinion of the Advocate General played a crucial
role in the Court's decision. In fact, the Advocate General argued that the
market did not offer specific and objective references and therefore the
assessment of La Poste's behavior ran the risk of being excessively
hypothetical and abstract. 42 Consequently, the Advocate General suggested
considering the costs borne by La Poste as the only parameter necessary to
assess the existence of state aid.43  The Advocate General accepted that,
alternatively, reference could have been made to the market economy
investor principle ("M.E.I.P."); however, the cost coverage test offered
more guarantees. 44 The Advocate General pointed out that reference to the
M.E.I.P. would not have been sufficient to exclude elements of state aid in
the remuneration required to Chronopost. In fact, a private holding
company in the same position as La Poste could decide, pursuing a long
term commercial strategy, not to pass all costs onto its subsidiary in order to
enhance its ability to compete and to maximize the profits. 5 If authorized
to allocate the costs in this way, La Poste "could give the subsidiary the
exclusive advantage of all the economies of scale arising from the use of a
postal network already established for the provision of a universal service,
in order to increase its profits and thus the profits of the group as a whole,"
42 The Advocate General concluded that the prices charged by La Poste could not be
compared with those of other companies, taking into account the universal service obligation
to which La Poste has to comply. Furthermore, none of Chronopost's competitors had ever
sought to have access to La Poste's network (this made it impossible to verify whether they
would have been ready to pay the price required by the French Post Office for logistical and
commercial assistance).
43 It should be noted, however, that the Commission, in its state aid practice, has
frequently referred to experts' studies and simulations in order to assess the behavior of state
owned companies, especially in cases where the market economy investor principle was a
core issue.
44 The M.E.I.P. refers to the behavior of a private market investor as a benchmark for the
assessment of the behavior of the state in the market. The application of the M.E.I.P. to the
transaction between La Poste and Chronopost would have implied checking "whether a
commercial investor would be satisfied with the level of consideration received" for the
provision of services. See Joined Cases 83/01, 93/01 & 94/01 P, Chronopost v. Ufex, para.
52 (Dec. 12, 2002) at http://curia.eu.int./jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang-en&Submit-
Submit&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=-C-83%2F01 +P&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=
&domaine=&mots= &resmax= 100 (Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano)..
45 Id. at para. 52. He explained that:
[A] private undertaking in the same position as La Poste would have to fix the amount of the
remuneration so as to maximize the profits for the group as a whole, allowing naturally for
the profits distributed by the subsidiary operating in the express delivery sector. Such an
undertaking might therefore be satisfied with a lower return in pursuit of a general strategy
designed to strengthen the subsidiary's competitive position in the express delivery market.
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thus gaining a relevant competitive advantage over other express courier
operators that had no access to a public postal network.46
The Court, however, defined more accurately the conditions under
which pricing for the services of a public network operator constitute
"normal market conditions., 47 In particular, it explicitly included the costs
of the network among those to be allocated to the subsidiary for fixing the
price in return for the services rendered. It follows, in the Court's view,
that the existence of unlawful subsidies can be excluded once it is verified
that the undertaking operating on a competitive market has paid an
appropriate price. Such a price must be sufficient to cover: (1) all the
additional variable costs in which the public holding company incurs in
providing the logistical and commercial assistance; (2) an appropriate
contribution to the fixed costs arising from the use of the postal network,
and (3) an adequate return on the capital investment insofar as it is used to
finance the competitive activity. 48 These three conditions are sufficient to
exclude the existence of any state aid as long as the costs have not been
underestimated or fixed in an arbitrary fashion.49 Accordingly, the ECJ
annulled the ruling of the CFI and affirmed the Commission's 1997
decision.
III. COMMENTS ON THE CHRONOPOST RULING
A. One Step Forward: A Clearer Legal Framework for Public
Intervention on the Market
With Chronopost, the ECJ had the final say on a very critical issue, the
importance of which goes well beyond the specific facts raised in the case.
The judgment confers greater legal certainty in applying state aid rules to
companies operating in both reserved and competitive sectors.
The EC's process of gradual liberalization of public utility sectors,
together with the need to ensure the provision of SGEls, resulted in a
dichotomy between reserved sectors, generally operated by former public
incumbents, and sectors open to competition. Under these circumstances,
the effective operation of an internal market based on undistorted
competition requires that the relations between undertakings operating on
both reserved and competitive markets be transparent and clear. In
46 Joined Cases 83/01, 93/01 & 94/01 P, Chronopost v. Ufex, para. 51 (Dec. 12, 2002),
available at http://curia.eu.int./jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang-en&Submit=
Submit&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=C-83%2F0 I+P&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=
&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100 (Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano).






addition, the operator of a public service network should not be allowed to
take advantage of its position on the reserved market to gain undue
competitive advantages in markets open to competition. At the same time,
a state-owned undertaking must be able to pursue a genuine commercial
strategy, organize its economic activities as a private company would, and
gain access to competitive markets.5 0 This is not only accepted under the
EC law principle of neutrality,5 1 but is also highly desirable; it allows for
public services to be financed through revenues gained in competitive
markets, thus enhancing the efficiency of public network industries.
Against this background, the ECJ's judgment in Chronopost can be
regarded as a significant contribution. It defines the criteria needed to
assess the relations between activities carried out in the reserved sector and
those subject to competition. With Chronopost, the Court added some
eagerly awaited guidelines to its previous ruling in the SFEI case, which
had left both national authorities and the Commission with too much
discretion in defining "normal market conditions." It recognized the
validity of a straightforward and clear method to verify whether the transfer
of resources and the provision of services between firms like La Poste and
Chronopost entail undue cross-subsidies.
By requiring that variable costs and network costs (plus a return on the
invested capital) both be covered, the Court has excluded the recourse to
external parameters-such as pricing practices of other firms-for the
purposes of assessing the consistency of intra-group transactions with EC
state aid rules. The indication of cost-coverage as a sufficient condition to
exclude the application of Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty to cases such as
Chronopost can be welcomed as a significant step towards legal
predictability. It is now established under EC law that a state-owned
company is free to pursue its strategic goals, including the promotion of its
subsidiaries vis-A-vis their competitors. However, economies of scale
deriving from the use of a public network, conceived for the provision of
SGEIs, cannot be entirely transferred onto activities performed in
neighboring markets. Indeed, the price paid for access to the network must
cover part of the costs of the network itself as well as a return on the capital
invested on it.
Therefore, with the Chronopost ruling, the Court has set a bright-line
standard, and compliance with this standard can be easily monitored by the
Commission and made subject to judicial control. However, some
questions still remain. In particular, to what extent is it still possible to
refer to "normal market conditions?" Is the cost-based approach sufficient
to guarantee that competition is not unduly distorted?
50 Commission Decision 2002/149/CE, SNCM, 2002 O.J. (L 50) 66, at para. 114.
51 See, EC TREATY, supra note 2, at art. 295.
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B. Two Steps Back: A "Competing Monopolist"?
As noted above, the ECJ was called upon to make a clear-cut choice
between two divergent interpretations of the SFEI ruling, which in fact
correspond to a precise policy choice. On the one hand, the CFI tried to
ensure that the use of a public network would not affect the conditions of
competition on downstream markets, and notably that the state-owned
operator would not derive any undue benefit from the economies of scale of
the network itself. It could be reasonably argued that access to such a
unique infrastructure was per se a relevant competitive advantage. The ECJ
and the Commission, on the other hand, chose to focus on the question of
cost coverage, assessing La Poste and Chronopost's relationship from the
provider's perspective, and avoided addressing the issue of the transference
of scale economies from the reserved sector to the market.
In its reasoning, the ECJ did not dwell on an economic assessment of
the consequences deriving from the use of one method instead of the other.
Nor did the Court acknowledge how different the approaches are between
the Commission and the CFI, if one takes into account the necessity of
maintaining a sound level of competition on the market. Instead, the ECJ
insisted on the necessity of carrying out an analysis based on "objective and
verifiable elements," i.e. the costs for the provision of the services
rendered.52 As a result, while it might appear to be a clarification of the
principle defined in SFEI, the ruling in Chronopost rather constitutes a clear
departure from the "normal market conditions" test. In fact, the ECJ
maintained that no benchmark existed in order to compare the situation of
La Poste with that of a private group of undertakings.53 Therefore, the
notion of "normal market conditions" had become purely hypothetical and
was to be assessed not against a "normal market" operator, but against the
monopolist itself.
While the ECJ made clear that its criteria were chosen to ensure the
highest possible level of legal certainty, the Court's reasons for defining
costs borne by a monopolist as "normal market conditions" are somewhat
obscure. The ECJ has asserted that it is impossible to compare a public
monopolist with a private operator, underlining the fact that the creation
and maintenance of its network are not in line with a purely commercial
approach.54 It went even further by saying that a private undertaking would
have never created a network such as that operated by La Poste. On this
basis, it is not clear how the costs of this network can then turn into "normal
market conditions" for the purposes of the application of Article 87 of the
EC Treaty. It could be argued that, with the Chronopost ruling, the ECJ has
52Chronopost, supra note 1 at para. 39, available at http://curia.eu.int/en/index.htm.
53 Id. at para. 38.
54 Id. at para. 36.
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shaped a paradoxical profile of a "competing monopolist."
It follows from the Court's ruling that a monopolist's intervention in
competitive markets, whereby the benefits of its unique cost structure and
economies of scale and scope are transferred to its subsidiaries, does not
raise competition concerns, provided that the costs allocated to the
competing subsidiary have not been underestimated or fixed in arbitrary
fashion.55 In this respect, any interested party remains able to detect and
challenge abusive cross-subsidization practices enacted through an incorrect
allocation of the costs.
The conclusion reached by the Court appears even more paradoxical
once the Chronopost ruling is compared with the recent judgment on the
Altmark case, which was pronounced three weeks later.56 In Altmark, the
ECJ was asked to clarify whether the compensation granted for fulfilling a
public service obligation ("PSO") could constitute state aid and, therefore,
infringe Article 87 of the EC Treaty.57 Essentially, the Court ruled that
PSO compensations do not constitute state aid as long as the following four
conditions are met:
1. The recipient undertaking is actually required to discharge
clearly defined public service obligations;
2. The compensation is calculated according to predetermined
parameters established in an objective and transparent manner;
3. The compensation is proportionate to the cost incurred in
discharging the public service obligations;
4. Where the undertaking is not chosen in a public procurement
procedure, "the level of compensation needed has been
determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a
typical undertaking, well run and [... ] able to meet the
necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in
discharging those obligations."58
It could be argued that the fourth condition set out by the Court cannot be
easily reconciled with the principle defined in Chronopost. It is unclear
how national judges, or the Commission itself, can establish the correctness
of the level of compensation on the basis of the comparison with a "typical
undertaking." As noted supra, the Court in Chronopost has said that, at
least in certain cases, public services providers have a peculiar structure that
55 Id. at para. 40.
56 Case C-280/00, Altrnark Trans GmbH v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH
(July 24, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang-
en&Submit=Submit&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=-C-280%2F00&datefs=&datefe=
&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax= 100.
57 Id. at paras. 30-31.
58 Id. at paras. 89-93.
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has "no equivalent on the market., 59 The Court therefore seems to have
ruled out the possibility of making the comparison required in Altmark. It
has been pointed out that one possible solution to reconcile the two rulings
is that the fourth condition in the Altmark case should not operate in cases
like Chronopost.60 While this solution would allow for the application of
the other three criteria in all cases, it would not be consistent with the
Altmark ruling, since it removes the efficiency criterion, which is implied in
the fourth condition thereof.
C. Chronopost in Context: The European Community Debate on Services
of General Economic Interest
The Chronopost judgment can be further read in the context of the
regulation of SGEIs in the European Union. In the Community legal order,
both the courts 6 1 and the regulators 62 have contributed to the creation of a
framework that both promotes competition and allows the proper funding of
services of general economic interest. Such a framework embraces a view
to guaranteeing their provision, which is considered as a factor of social and
economic cohesion. As a result, member states are allowed under certain
conditions, to compensate firms for the net additional costs incurred for the
provision of a public service imposed by their public authorities. This
framework is shaped to prevent the overcompensation of public service
obligations, or the transfer of resources intended to cover public service
costs from reserved activities to competitive ones. It is also aimed at
preventing possible misallocations, whereby costs generated in the carrying
out of competitive activities are shifted onto the reserved sectors. The main
instruments that are used to prevent and act against anticompetitive cross-
subsidizations are EC state aid rules, Transparency Directives, 63 and sector-
specific rules regulating the universal service provision.
During the 1990s, the process of creating the internal market, the
59 Chronopost, supra note 1 at para. 36.
60 See A. Bartosch, Clarification or Confusion? How to Reconcile the ECJ's Rulings in
Altmark and Chronopost, 3 EuR. ST. AID L. Q., at para. 384 (2003).
61 See, e.g., Case C-320/91, Criminal Proceedings Against Paul Corbeau, 1993 E.C.R. I-
2533; Case T-106/95, FFSA v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. 11-229; Case C-157/94,
Commission v. Netherlands, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5699; Case C-266/96, Corsica Ferries France SA
v. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del Porto di Genova Coop. arl, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3949.
62 See, e.g., Council Directive 97/67 on Common Rules for The Development of The
Internal Market of Community Postal Services and The Improvement of Quality or Service,
1998 O.J. (L 15) 14, 20; Council Regulation 2408/92 on Access for Community Air Carriers
to Intra-community Air Routes, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8, 10; Council Regulation 3577/92
Applying the Principle of Freedom to Provide Services to Maritime Transport Within
Member States, 1992 O.J. (L 364) 7.
63 Commission Directive 80/723, 1980 O.J. (L 195) 35, amended by Commission
Directive 2000/52, 2000 O.J. (L 193) 75.
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constraints on public finances deriving from the EMU, and technological
evolution led to the progressive privatization and/or liberalization of public
utilities in Europe. The opening of the markets was achieved either through
Community legislation or through the action of the Commission and EC
courts. Such opening challenged national monopolies through competition
rules, particularly Article 86 (1) of the EC Treaty.64 The progressive
creation of a competitive environment in sectors such as post, energy,
electronic communications and transport has been counterbalanced by the
growing attention to the maintenance of adequate public services at all
levels.
Whereas liberalizing legislation contains several provisions to limit
competition, with the same aim and a view to guaranteeing the provision of
universal services, the Court and the Commission have used the provision
under Article 86 (2) of the EC Treaty, which allows for an exclusion of the
application of competition rules.65 Furthermore, both the Commission and
the Council have issued a number of soft-law documents, restating the
importance of SGEIs in the European Union.66 Finally, SGEIs are
mentioned both in Article 16 of the Treaty of Amsterdam and in Article 36
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, thus establishing legal protection
at the highest level of Community legal order.67
64 Case C-202/88, French Republic v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1223; Case C-179/90,
Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v. Siderurgica Gabrielli, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5889; Case C-
41/90, Hrfner v. Macrotron, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979; Case C-55/96, Non-Contentious
Proceedings Brought by Job Centre Coop. arl, 1997 E.C.R. 1-7119; Case C-320/91, Criminal
Proceedings Against Paul Corbeau, 1993 E.C.R. 1-2533.
65Article 86 (2) of the EC Treaty states that:
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having
the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this
Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules
does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.
The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the
interests of the Community.
EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 86 (2).
For reference to Article 86 (2) of the EC Treaty as a justification for State aid, see SNCM,
supra note 50. See also Commission Decision 2001/156 on the State Aid Implemented by
Spain in Favour of the Maritime Transport Sector, 2001 O.J. (L 57) 32; Commission
Decision 2001/851 on the State Aid Awarded to the Tirrenia di Navigazione Shipping
Company by Italy, 2001 O.J. (L 318) 9.
66 See sources cited supra note 3.
67 Article 16 of the EC Treaty states that:
Without prejudice to Articles 73, 86 and 87, and given the place occupied by services of
general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in
promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Community and the Member States, each
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It is not surprising then that, in the reasoning of Chronopost, the Court
took account of the Universal Service Obligations binding on La Poste.
The ECJ acknowledged that those obligations could justify the making up
and the operation of the public postal network.68  It seems to us that the
Court admits, although implicitly that La Poste's subsidiaries could benefit
from part of the economies of scale deriving from the public network.
These advantages were not to be qualified as state aid but rather as an
inherent consequence of the use of a network created for a legitimate
purpose, i.e., the provision of a SGEI.69 While it is not possible to say
whether the Court would have taken a different decision, had the state
owned network had justifications other than the Universal Postal Service, it
appears from the text of the judgment that the function of the network has
played a significant political role.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
With the Chronopost judgment, the Court provided a welcome
clarification on the relation between reserved activities and competitive
activities in the context of the application of state aid rules to the network
industries. In the case at issue, the Court fixed as a benchmark for
evaluating the compensation for the logistical and commercial assistance
the costs borne by the "monopolist. ' '70 In the lack of market criteria, these
costs represented the only objective and verifiable elements available.
What is more, given that a mere reference to the additional costs of the
assistance would allow to pass the benefits of the network (scale and scope
economies) onto the subsidiary, the Court not only referred to the additional
variable costs incurred in providing the services at stake, but also included
an appropriate contribution to the fixed costs arising from the use of the
network and an adequate return on capital investment, in so far as it was
used for the competitive services rendered. The reference to part of the
network costs, in particular, aims at avoiding that the economies of scale
resulting from the network are transferred, as such, to the competitive
activities.
In this regard, Chronopost goes beyond the SFEIjudgment. The latter
merely refers to undetermined "normal market conditions," leaving a wide
margin of appreciation as to the circumstances in which these conditions are
within their respective powers and within the scope of application of this Treaty, shall take
care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions which enable them
to fulfill their missions.
EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 16.
68 Chronopost, supra note 1 at para. 32-34.
69 Id. at paras. 34-36.
70 Id. at para. 39.
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fulfilled. Aware of the shortcomings of the above principle, the Court
adopted a new benchmark, which is far from being a specification of
"normal market conditions." The costs of the network operator on the
upstream market are the costs of a monopolistic operator. It follows that, in
the absence of other objective and verifiable elements, the monopoly costs
represent the "normal market conditions" (hence, the Paradox of the
Competing Monopolist).
Ultimately, using the monopolist costs might allow for more flexibility
in cases where, such in Chronopost, companies entrusted with a SGEI grant
assistance to their subsidiaries operating in competitive markets. It remains
to be seen to what extent this favorable attitude of the Court will allow for a
less austere application of state aid rules in the network industries.

